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Abstract. This paper presents an experience report on the specification and the
validation of a real case study in the context of the industrial CRISTAL project.
The case study concerns a platoon of a new type of urban vehicles with new func-
tionalities and services. It is specified using the combination, named CSP‖B, of
two well-known formal methods, and validated using the corresponding support
tools. This large – both distributed and embedded – system typically corresponds
to a multi-level composition of components that have to cooperate. We identify
some lessons learned, showing how to develop and verify the specification and
check some properties in a compositional way using theoretical results and sup-
port tools to validate this complex system.
Keywords: formal methods, CSP||B, compositional modelling, specification, ver-
ification, case study
1 Introduction
This paper is dedicated to an experience report on the specification and the validation
of a real case study in the land transportation domain. It takes place in the context of
the industrial CRISTAL project which concerns the developpement of a new type of
urban vehicles with new functionalities and services. One of its major cornerstones is
the development, the validation and the certification of platoon of vehicles. A platoon is
a set of autonomous vehicles which have to move in a convoy – i.e. following the path
of the leader – through an intangible hooking.
Through the CRISTAL project’s collaboration, we have decided to consider each
vehicle, named Cristal in the following, as an agent of a Multi-Agent System (MAS).
The Cristal driving system perceives information about its environment before produc-
ing an instantaneous acceleration passed to its engine. In this context, we consider the
platooning problem as a situated MAS which evolves following the Influence/Reaction
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the French National Research Agency TACOS
project, ANR-06-SETI-017 (http://tacos.loria.fr) and by the pôle de compétitivité
Alsace/Franche-Comté CRISTAL project (http://www.projet-cristal.net).
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Fig. 1. A platoon of Cristals
model (I/R) [1] in which agents are described separately from the environment. The
driving control concerns both a longitudinal control, i.e. maintaining an ideal distance
between each vehicle, and a lateral control, i.e. each vehicle should follow the track of
its predecessor, see Fig. 1. Both controls can be studied independently [2]. At this time,
we focus solely on the longitudinal control.
The platoon of Cristal vehicles is a mix of distributed and embedded systems. The
former are usually hard to understand and to debug as they can exhibit obscure be-
haviours. The latter require the satisfaction of safety/security/confidence requirements,
alone and when composed together. To address these problems, we reuse the CSP‖B
framework proposed by Schneider and Treharne [3] of well-established formal meth-
ods, B, an environment for the development of provably correct software [4], and CSP
(for Communicating Sequential Processes), a process algebra introduced by Hoare [5]
for modelling patterns of interactions. We motivate the use of CSP‖B by the existence
of pure B models describing the agents and vehicles behaviours [6]. By using CSP for
coordinating B machines, we aim at giving these B models the architectural, composi-
tional description they lack.
Our approach can be described as a mix between a “bottom-up” and a component-
based development. On the one hand, B machines are seen as the smallest abstract
components representing various parts of a Cristal vehicle. On the other hand, CSP is
used to put these components together, to describe higher-level compounds such as a
vehicle or a whole convoy and to make them communicate.
Our first experience with the CSP‖B platoon model is presented in a short paper [7].
Here the description of the case study involves detailing two architectural levels. We
first consider a single Cristal, then we show how to reuse it to constitute a platoon.
Later on we make the model evolve by replacing one component with several others to
separate functionalities and refine them3. This can be achieved for instance by adapters
to connect these new components within the initial architecture [8]. We follow a similar
approach, only CSP-oriented. Moreover we use previous theoretical results on CSP‖B
in an unintended way in this context.
On both the model description and its evolution, we illustrate the relevance of
CSP‖B for eliminating errors and ambiguities in an assembly and its communication
3 CSP‖B specifications discussed in this paper are available at
http://tacos.loria.fr/platoon-fmics08.zip
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protocols. We are convinced that writing formal specifications can aid in the process of
designing autonomous vehicles.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the basic concepts
and existing tools on CSP‖B. Section 3 presents the specification and the verification
process of a single Cristal vehicle whereas Sect. 4 is dedicated to a platoon of vehicles.
Section 5 details a vehicle introducing new components, the engine and the location
ones. Section 6 presents related works, and Sect. 7 ends with lessons learned from this
industrial experience and some perspectives of this development.
2 Basic concepts and tools on CSP‖B
The B machines specifying components are open modules which interact by the au-
thorised operation invocations. CSP describes processes, i.e. objects or entities which
exist independently, but may communicate with each other. When combining CSP and
B to develop distributed and concurrent systems, CSP is used to describe execution
orders for invoking the B machines operations and communications between the CSP
processes.
2.1 B Machines
B is a formal software development method used to model and reason about systems [4].
The B method has proved its strength in industry with the development of complex
real-life applications such as the Roissy VAL [9]. The principle behind building a B
model is the expression of system properties which are always true after each evolution
step of the model. The verification of a model correctness is thus akin to verifying the
preservation of these properties, no matter which step of evolution the system takes.
The B method is based on first-order logic, set theory and relations. Properties are
specified in the INVARIANT clause of the model, and its evolution is specified by the
operations in the OPERATIONS clause (see Fig. 3 for an example). The verification of
a B model consists in verifying that each operation – assuming its precondition and
the invariant hold – satisfies the INVARIANT, i.e. the model is consistent. Support tools
such as B4free (http://www.b4free.com) or AtelierB (http://www.atelierb.eu)
automatically generate proof obligations to ensure the consistency.
A strength of the B method is its stepwise refinement feature: the REFINEMENT of
a model makes it less indeterministic and more precise with the introduction of more
programming language-like features. Refinement can be done until the code of the op-
erations can actually be implemented in a programming language. The consistency of
a refinement must also be checked, this time by ensuring that the newly introduced
behaviour and/or data do not contradict the model they refine.
2.2 Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP)
CSP allows the description of entities, called processes, which exist independently but
may communicate with each other. Thanks to dedicated operators it is possible to de-
scribe a set of processes as a single process, making CSP an ideal formalism for build-
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ing a hierarchical composition of components. CSP is supported by the FDR2 model
checker (http://www.fsel.com).
Its denotational semantics is based on the observation of process behaviours. Three
kinds of behaviours [10] are observed and well suited for the expression of properties:
– traces, i.e. finite sequences of events, for safety properties;
– stable failures, i.e. traces augmented with a set of unperformable events at the end
thereof, for liveness properties and deadlock-freedom;
– failures/divergences, i.e. stable failures augmented with traces ending in an infinite
loop of internal events, for livelock-freedom.
Each semantics is associated with a notion of process refinement denoted:
– ⊑T for traces refinement;
– ⊑SF for stable failures refinement and
– ⊑FD for failures/divergences refinement.
2.3 CSP‖B components
In this section, we sum up the works by Schneider and Treharne on CSP‖B. The reader
interested in theoretical results is referred to [3,11,12]; for case studies, see for exam-
ple [13,14].
Specifying CSP controllers. In CSP‖B, the B part is specified as a standard B machine
without any restriction, while a controller for a B machine is a particular kind of CSP
process, called a CSP controller, defined by the following (subset of the) CSP grammar:
P ::= c ? x ! v → P | ope ! v ? x → P | b & P
| P1  P2 | if b then P1 else P2 | S(p)
The process c ? x ! v → P can accept input x and output v along a communication
channel c. Having accepted x, it behaves as P.
A controller makes use of machine channels which provide the means for con-
trollers to synchronise with the B machine. For each operation x ← ope(v) of a con-
trolled machine, there is a channel ope ! v ? x in the controller corresponding to the
operation call: the output value v from the CSP description corresponds to the input
parameter of the B operation, and the input value x corresponds to the output of the
operation. A controlled B machine can only communicate on the machine channels of
its controller.
The behaviour of a guarded process b & P depends on the evaluation of the boolean
condition b: if it is true, it behaves as P, otherwise it is unable to perform any events.
In some works (e.g. [3]), the notion of blocking assertion is defined by using a guarded
process on the inputs of a channel to restrict these inputs: c ? x & E(x) → P.
The external choice P1  P2 is initially prepared to behave either as P1 or as P2,
with the choice made on the occurrence of the first event. The conditional choice
if b then P1 else P2 behaves as P1 or P2 depending on b. Finally, S(p) expresses a
recursive call.
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Assembling CSP‖B components. In addition to the expression of simple processes,
CSP provides operators to combine them. The sharing operator P1 ‖E P2 executes P1
and P2 concurrently, requiring that P1 and P2 synchronise on the events into the sharing
alphabet E and allowing independent executions for other events. When combining a
CSP controller P and a B machine M associated with P, the sharing alphabet can be
dropped ((P ‖α(M) M) ≡ P ‖ M) as there is no ambiguity.
We also consider an indexed form of the sharing operator ‖iEiP(i ) which executes
the processes P(i ) in a sharing manner. It is used to build up a collection of similar
controlled machines which exchange together.
Verifying CSP‖B components. The verification process to ensure the consistency of
a controlled machine (P‖M) in CSP‖B consists in verifying the following conditions:
1. the M machine consistency is checked using the B4Free proof tool;
2. the P controller deadlock-freedom in the stable-failures model is checked with the
FDR2 model-checking tool;
3. the P controller divergence-freedom is checked with FDR2;
4. the divergence-freedom of (P‖M) can be deduced by using a technique based on
Control Loop Invariants (CLI):
– P is translated into a B machine BBODYP using the rewriting rules of [11];
– a CLI is added to BBODYP;
– the BBODYP machine consistency checking is performed with B4Free;
– by way of [12, Theorem 1], we deduce the divergence-freedom of (P‖M);
5. by way of [3, Theorem 5.9] and the fact that P is deadlock-free, we deduce the
deadlock-freedom of (P‖M) in the stable failures model.
This verification process can be generalised to achieve the consistency checking of
a collection of controlled machines ‖iEi (Pi ‖Mi):
1. we check the divergence-freedom of each (Pi ‖Mi) as previously;
2. by way of [3, Theorem 8.1], we deduce the divergence-freedom of ‖iEi (Pi ‖Mi);
3. we check the deadlock-freedom of ‖iEi (Pi) with FDR2;
4. by way of [3, Theorem 8.6], we deduce the deadlock-freedom of ‖iEi (Pi ‖Mi).
3 Specifying a Single Cristal
As depicted in Fig. 2, in a first approximation, a Cristal vehicle is composed of two
parts: the vehicle and its driving system which controls the vehicle. Each part is itself
built upon a B machine controlled by an associated CSP process.
3.1 The Vehicle
Specifying the vehicle. The vehicle is a behavioural component reacting to a given ac-
celeration for speeding up or slowing down. It is built upon a Vehicle Bmachine that de-
scribes its inner workings, i.e. its knowledge of speed and location as well as how it up-
dates them w.r.t. a given acceleration, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The speed← getSpeed()
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Fig. 2. Architectural view of a Cristal
MODEL Vehicle
VARIABLES
speed, xpos
OPERATIONS
speed0← getSpeed = BEGIN speed0 := speed END ;
xpos0← getXpos = BEGIN xpos0 := xpos END ;
setAccel(accel) =
PRE accel ∈ MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL
THEN
ANY new_speed
WHERE new_speed = speed + accel
THEN
IF (new_speed > MAX_SPEED)
THEN
xpos := xpos + MAX_SPEED ‖ speed := MAX_SPEED
ELSE
IF (new_speed < 0)
THEN
xpos := xpos − (speed × speed) / (2 × accel)
‖ speed := 0
ELSE
xpos := xpos + speed + accel / 2 ‖ speed := new_speed
END
END
END
END
END
Fig. 3. The Vehicle B model
REFINEMENT CtrlVehicle_ref
VARIABLES
xpos_csp, speed_csp, cb
INVARIANT
xpos_csp ∈ Positions_csp
∧ speed_csp ∈ Speeds_csp
∧ cb = 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlVehicle =
BEGIN
CHOICE
BEGIN
xpos_csp← getXpos ;
speed_csp← getSpeed ;
ANY accel_csp WHERE
accel_csp ∈ Accels_csp
THEN
setAccel(accel_csp); cb := 0
END
END
OR
BEGIN
speed_csp← getSpeed ;
xpos_csp← getXpos;
ANY accel_csp WHERE
accel_csp ∈ Accels_csp
THEN
setAccel(accel_csp); cb := 0
END
END
END
END
END
Fig. 4. B rewriting of
CtrlVehicle
CtrlVehicle =
( getXpos ? xpos→ getSpeed ? speed→ vehicleInfo ! xpos ! speed→
vehicleAccel ? accel → setAccel ! accel → CtrlVehicle )

( getSpeed ? speed→ getXpos ? xpos→ vehicleInfo ! xpos ! speed→
vehicleAccel ? accel → setAccel ! accel → CtrlVehicle )
Fig. 5. The CtrlVehicle CSP controller
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and xpos ← getXpos() methods capture data from the vehicle. The setAccel(accel)
method models how the vehicle behaves when passed on a new instantaneous accel-
eration.
The Bmachine is made able to communicate by adding a CSP controller, CtrlVehicle ,
depicted in Fig. 5. It schedules the calls to its various methods. The speed and the lo-
cation are passed on to the controller through getSpeed ? speed and getXpos ? xpos
channels corresponding to invocations of the homonymous methods of the B machine to
retrieve the speed and the location of the vehicle. Then, information about speed and lo-
cation is sent to requesting components through vehicleInfo ! xpos ! speed. Similarly,
the controller receives new instantaneous acceleration orders through vehicleAccel ?
accel and passes them on through setAccel ! accel to the B machine.
The whole vehicle component with communication facilities is then defined as a
parallel composition of the Vehicle machine and its CtrlVehicle controller.
Verifying the vehicle. We follow the verification process given Sect. 2.3 to ensure the
consistency of (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle):
– the Vehicle B machine consistency is successfully checked using B4Free;
– the CtrlVehicle controller deadlock-freedom and its divergence-freedom are suc-
cessfully checked with FDR2;
– Figure 4 illustrates the B rewriting of CtrlVehicle . Its CLI is actually as simple as
the ⊤ predicate modulo the typing predicates. This rewriting is shown consistent
with B4Free, then (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) is divergence-free;
– we automatically deduce the deadlock-freedom of (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle).
3.2 The Driving System
Specifying the driving system. The driving system (CtrlDrivingSystem(mode)‖Driving
System) is built up in a similar way. A DrivingSystem B machine models the decision
system: it updates its perceptions and decides for an acceleration passed on to the phys-
ical vehicle later on.
Communications are managed by a CtrlDrivingSystem CSP controller shown Fig. 6.
It has four running modes corresponding to different uses of a Cristal: SOLO, LEADER
of a platoon of Cristals, FOLLOWER of another Cristal into a platoon, and LAST vehicle
of a platoon.
In the SOLOmode, the controller requests Cristal speed from the vehicle via vehicle
Info ? myXpos ? mySpeed so as to make the HCI displays it (hciSpeed ! mySpeed). It
also receives an acceleration from the human driver passed on through hciAccel ? accel
and sends this desired acceleration to the vehicle through vehicleAccel ! accel.
The LEADER mode is very similar to the SOLO mode. The only difference consists
in additional sending of the Cristal information to the following Cristal via comOut !
mySpeed ! myXpos.
The FOLLOWERmode uses the DrivingSystem B machine: information required by
the machine to compute an accurate speed are obtained from the vehicle (vehicleInfo ?
myXpos ? mySpeed) and from the leading Cristal (comIn ? preSpeed ? preXpos). Once
data are obtained, they are passed on to the B machine through the setPerceptions()
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DrivingSys_percept(mode) =
( (mode == SOLO) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed→ DrivingSys_act(mode) )

( (mode == LEADER) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed → comOut ! mySpeed ! myXpos→
DrivingSys_act(mode) )

( (mode == FOLLOWER) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ comIn ? preSpeed ? preXpos→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed→
setPerceptions! myXpos ! mySpeed ! preXpos ! preSpeed→ comOut ! mySpeed ! myXpos→
DrivingSys_act(mode) )

( (mode == LAST) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ comIn ? preSpeed ? preXpos→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed→
setPerceptions! myXpos ! mySpeed ! preXpos ! preSpeed→ DrivingSys_act(mode) )
DrivingSys_act(mode) =
( (mode == SOLO) ∨ (mode == LEADER) &
hciAccel ? accel → vehicleAccel ! accel → DrivingSys_percept(mode) )

( (mode == FOLLOWER) ∨ (mode == LAST) &
getInfluences ? accel → vehicleAccel ! accel → DrivingSys_percept(mode) )
CtrlDrivingSystem(mode) = DrivingSys_percept(mode)
Fig. 6. The CtrlDrivingSystem(mode) CSP Controller
method and sent to the following Cristal via comOut ! mySpeed ! myXpos. Otherwise,
the acceleration is obtained by a call to the getInfluences() method, and the result is
passed on to the vehicle via vehicleAccel ! accel.
The LAST mode is very similar to the FOLLOWER mode. The only difference is
that the last vehicle does not send its data to another one.
Verifying the driving system. Using the verification process given Sect. 2.3, the driv-
ing system is shown divergence-free and deadlock-free:
– the DrivingSystem B machine is consistent;
– for each mode, the CtrlDrivingSystem(mode) CSP controller is deadlock-free and
divergence-free;
– the B rewriting of CtrlDrivingSystem(mode) is consistent.
3.3 The Cristal(mode) Assembly
Specifying the assembly. As illustrated Fig. 2, a Cristal is defined as the parallel com-
position of a vehicle and its associated driving system, expressed in CSP by:
Cristal(mode) =(CtrlVehicle ‖ Vehicle)
n
{∣∣∣ vehicleInfo,vehicleAccel ∣∣∣}
(CtrlDrivingSystem(mode) ‖ DrivingSystem)
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Verifying the assembly. Cristal (mode) is shown consistent following the verification
process given in Sect. 2.3:
– (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) and (CtrlDrivingSystem(mode)‖DrivingSystem) are divergence-
free, hence Cristal (mode) is also divergence-free;
– (CtrlVehicle ‖CtrlDrivingSystem(mode)) is shown deadlock-free with FDR2, then
Cristal (mode) is deadlock-free.
Checking a safety property. A safety property we are interested in, states that percep-
tion and reaction should alternate while the Cristal runs, i.e. the data are always updated
(vehicleInfo ) before applying an instantaneous acceleration to the vehicle (vehicleAccel).
This property is captured by the following CSP process:
Property = vehicleInfo ? xpos ? speed→ vehicleAccel ? accel→ Property
We need to show that the Cristal meets this property. For that, we first successfully
check with FDR2 that there is a trace refinement between the CSP part of Cristal (mode)
and Property, i.e. Property ⊑T CtrlVehicle ‖CtrlDrivingSystem(mode). Then, by apply-
ing [3, Corollary 7.2], we obtain that Property ⊑T Cristal (mode), i.e. the property is
satisfied by the Cristal (mode).
4 Specifying a Platoon of Cristals
Fig. 7. A Platoon of four Cristals
Once we dispose of a correct model for a single Cristal (mode), we can focus on
the specification of a platoon as presented Fig.7. We want the various Cristals to avoid
going stale when they move in a platoon. This might happen because a Cristal waits for
information from its leading one, i.e. we do not want the communications in the convoy
to deadlock.
Specifying the assembly. From the CSP||B specification of a generic Cristal (mode)
given in the previous section, we first define a Cristal occupying the position pos into
a platoon of max vehicles, as presented Fig. 8: if the Cristal is at the first position,
it runs on the LEADER mode, if it is at the last position, it runs on the LAST mode,
otherwise, it runs on the FOLLOWER mode. The communication channels are renamed
by com.pos/com.pos−1, so that the comOut channel of one Cristal matches with the
comIn channel of the following Cristal.
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Cristal_p(pos,max) =
if (pos == 1)
then ( Cristal (LEADER) [[ comOut← com.pos ]] )
else if (pos == max)
then ( Cristal (LAST) [[comIn← com.(pos−1) ]] )
else ( Cristal (FOLLOWER) [[comIn← com.(pos−1), comOut← com.pos ]] )
Fig. 8. Cristal_p(pos,max)
A platoon of max Cristals is defined as an assembly of max Cristal_p(pos,max)
synchronised on {| com.pos|}, as illustrated Fig. 7 for four vehicles:
Platoon(max) =
pos∈{1..max}n
{|com.pos|}
(Cristal_p(pos,max))
Verifying the assembly. To check the consistency of Platoon(max), we follow the
verification process presented in Sect. 2.3:
– since each Cristal is proved divergence-free, Platoon(max) is divergence-free;
– we have to consider the parallel composition of the CSP parts of all the Cristals.
For instance, with four Cristals:
((CtrlVehicle||CtrlDrivingSystem(LEADER))[[comOut← com.1]])
n
{|com.1|}
((CtrlVehicle||CtrlDrivingSystem(FOLLOWER))[[comIn← com.1, comOut← com.2]])
n
{|com.2|}
((CtrlVehicle||CtrlDrivingSystem(FOLLOWER))[[comIn← com.2, comOut← com.3]])
n
{|com.3|}
((CtrlVehicle||CtrlDrivingSystem(LAST))[[comIn← com.3]])
FDR2 checks that this assembly is deadlock-free, hence Platoon(max) is deadlock-
free. Consequently, this verification process validates the safety property introduced
at the beginning of Sect. 4 saying that the communications, expressed through re-
naming, should not deadlock.
5 Detailing (CtrlVehicle(mode)‖Vehicle)
The definition of the vehicle part presented in Sect. 3.1 is very general. In order to detail
information about the vehicle engine and its location, reflecting separation of concerns
inside the (CtrlVehicle (mode)‖Vehicle) component, we evolve the model presented in
Fig. 2 evolve. This evolution introduces new components as illustrated in Fig. 9. They
correspond to the following design choices:
1. Now the Vehicle B machine represents the “real” physical vehicle.
2. For compatibility purpose with the rest of the system, the CtrlVehicle is preserved
without any modifications.
3. Two new B components are added, modelling two sensors and an actuator, intro-
ducing a loss of precision to represent the sensor and actuator effects:
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Fig. 9. The Vehicle2 component
MODEL Location(er)
OPERATIONS
p_xpos← xposSensor(xpos) =
PRE xpos ∈ N
THEN
ANY xx WHERE xx ∈ N
∧ xpos − xpos × er / 100 ≤ xx
∧ xx ≤ xpos + xpos × er / 100
THEN
p_xpos := xx
END
END
END
Fig. 10. The Location B
model
– The B Location machine show Fig. 10 represents an abstract location system
able to determine the geographic location of the physical vehicle. It perceives
the “real” location and returns an approximated value through
p_xpos← xposSensor(xpos) (with an error of er%). It might be implemented
later on by a GPS system, for instance.
– The B Engine machine is introduced to model a speed sensor on the phys-
ical vehicle and an acceleration actuator. It senses the “real” speed, returns
an approximated value through p_speed← speedSensor(speed) and applies a
decided acceleration order through accel ← accelActuator(d_accel).
4. Three new CSP controllers must be introduced to control the new B machines and
to manage communications, i.e. perceptions on the physical world and exchanges
between the machines.
5.1 Three New CSP controllers
Specifying CtrlPhysical (Fig. 11). This controller manages the perceptions on the
real vehicle. It calls the speed← getSpeed() and xpos← getXpos() B methods – to
accurate the “real” speed and xpos – and sends these data on phyXpos ! xpos and
phySpeed ! speed. It receives a decided acceleration through phyAccel ? accel, then it
calls the method setAccel(accel) .
Specifying CtrlLocation (Fig. 12). This controller manages the B Locationmachine. It
perceives the “real” location on phyXpos ? xpos and calls p_xpos← xposSensor(xpos)
to pass them on to the Location component. It sends the perceived location through
xposOut ! p_xpos.
Specifying CtrlEngine (Fig. 13). This controller is in charge of the Engine B ma-
chine, i.e. the speed sensor and the acceleration actuator. A speed perception consists
in receiving the “real” speed on phySpeed, passing it on to the B machine by calling
the p_speed← speedSensor(speed) method, and sending the perceived speed through
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CtrlPhysical =
( getSpeed ? speed→ phySpeed ! speed→ getXpos ? xpos→
phyXpos ! xpos → phyAccel ? accel→ setAccel ! accel→ CtrlPhysical )

( getXpos ? xpos→ phyXpos ! xpos→ getSpeed ? speed→
phySpeed ! speed → phyAccel ? accel→ setAccel ! accel→ CtrlPhysical )
Fig. 11. The CtrlPhysical CSP controller
CtrlLocation =
phyXpos ? xpos→ xposSensor ! xpos ? p_xpos→ xposOut ! p_xpos→ phyAck→ phyAck→ CtrlLocation
Fig. 12. The CtrlLocation CSP controller
CtrlEngine =
phySpeed ? speed→ speedSensor ! speed ? p_speed→ speedOut ! p_speed→ phyAck→
accelIn ? d_accel→ accelActuator ! d_accel ? accel → phyAccel ! accel→ phyAck→ CtrlEngine
Fig. 13. The CtrlEngine CSP controller
spe edOut ! p_speed. An acceleration setting consists in receiving the decided accelera-
tion on accelIn ? d_accel, passing them on to Engine by calling accel ← accelActuator
(d_accel) and sending it to the real vehicle through phyAccel ! accel.
In our first model, speed and location perceptions are done before acceleration is
applied. Now, with the separation of concerns introduced by the two components Lo-
cation and Engine, it would be possible for location perception to be realised after an
acceleration setting, for instance. In order to ensure this, CtrlEngine and CtrlLocation
are synchronised through phyAck.
Verifying the new components. We successfully establish the consistency of (CtrlPhy
sical ‖Vehicle), (CtrlEngine‖Engine) and (CtrlLocation ‖ Location) using B4Free and
FDR2 by following the verification process presented in Sect. 2.3.
5.2 The Vehicle2 Assembly
Vehicle2 is defined as an assembly of the previously detailed components, synchronised
on their common channels:
Vehicle2 =


n
{∣∣∣∣ phyAccel,phySpeed,
phyXpos
∣∣∣∣
}

(CtrlEngine ‖ Engine) n
{|phyAck|}
(CtrlLocation ‖ Location)


(
CtrlPhysical
n
Vehicle
)


[[
accelIn← setAccel,
xposOut← getXpos,
speedOut← getSpeed
]]
Some channels have to be renamed to match those of the CtrlVehicle controller.
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Verifying that Vehicle2 refines Vehicle. The goal of the Vehicle component evolution
is to retain the initial architecture, i.e. we want to replace Vehicle into Cristal (mode) by
Vehicle2 and prove that the already established properties are still valid, among which:
– the deadlock-freedom of the whole vehicle (Sect. 3.1);
– the fact that perceptions and actions alternate (Sect. 3.3);
– the deadlock-freedom of the whole convoy (Sect. 4).
Hence Vehicle2 must externally show the same traces as Vehicle and should not
introduce new deadlocks. Proving that Vehicle2 refines Vehicle in the stable failures
semantics suffices for ensuring that. Indeed, the stable failures refinement preserves
safety properties (because it implies trace refinement), liveness properties and deadlock-
freedom [10].
We unfortunately face a problem. Vehicle is a B model and Vehicle2 is an assembly
of CSP controllers and B machines: there is no manner to check this kind of refinement.
To solve this problem, our proposal consists in lifting the refinement checking to an up-
per level, where refinement is well-defined. In a nutshell, we thus have to prove that the
(CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) component is refined by the (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle2) component
in the stable failures model which is denoted by:
(CtrlVehicle||Vehicle)\α(Vehicle)⊑SF (CtrlVehicle||Vehicle2)\α(Vehicle)
where α(Vehicle) ≡ {|getXpos,getSpeed,setAccel|}.
PROOF:
ASSUME:
CtrlVehicle2 =


n


∣∣∣∣∣∣
phyAccel,
phySpeed,
phyXpos
∣∣∣∣∣∣



CtrlEngine n
{|phyAck|}
CtrlLocation


CtrlPhysical


[[
accelIn← setAccel,
xposOut← getXpos,
speedOut← getSpeed
]]
(CtrlVehicle2 is the CSP part of Vehicle2)
1. (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF (CtrlVehicle‖CtrlVehicle2 )\ α(Vehicle)
PROOF:
1.1. CtrlVehicle \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF (CtrlVehicle‖CtrlVehicle2) \ α(Vehicle)
(verification carried out by FDR2)
1.2. (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF CtrlVehicle \ α(Vehicle)
PROOF:
1.2.1. traces( (( CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle) = traces(CtrlVehicle \ α(Vehicle))
(definition of traces, hiding of internal channels)
1.2.2. failures((CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle)) = failures(CtrlVehicle \ α(Vehicle)) = /0
(deadlock-freedom verified by FDR2, [3, theorem 5.9])
1.2.3. (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF CtrlVehicle \ α(Vehicle)
(1.2.1, 1.2.2, definition of ⊑SF )
1.3. (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF (CtrlVehicle‖CtrlVehicle2 )\ α(Vehicle)
( 1.1, 1.2, transitivity of ⊑SF )
2. (CtrlVehicle ‖CtrlVehicle2) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF (CtrlVehicle‖Vehicle2) \ α(Vehicle)
PROOF:
2.1. CtrlVehicle2 \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF Vehicle2 \ α(Vehicle)
([3, corollary 8.7] applied to controllers of Vehicle2)
2.2. (CtrlVehicle ‖CtrlVehicle2) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF (CtrlVehicle‖Vehicle2) \ α(Vehicle)
(2.1, monotonicity of ⊑SF w.r.t. ‖ and hiding)
3. (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF (CtrlVehicle‖Vehicle2) \ α(Vehicle)
(1, 2, transitivity of ⊑SF )
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As (CtrlVehicle ‖Vehicle) \ α(Vehicle) ⊑SF (CtrlVehicle‖Vehicle2) \ α(Vehicle) is
true, all the properties we wanted to preserve from Vehicle to Vehicle2 are still true:
the deadlock-freedom of a vehicle, the deadlock-freedom of the whole convoy as well
as the alternation of perceptions and actions. In conclusion, we can replace Vehicle by
Vehicle2 without having to check the properties again.
6 Related Works
In addition to works on CSP‖B mentioned in Sect. 2, we would like to cite [15], where
the authors present a formal framework for verifying distributed embedded systems.
An embedded system is described as a set of concurrent real time functions which
communicate through a network of interconnected switches involving messages queues
and routing services. It presents an abstraction-based verification method which consists
in abstracting the communication network by end-to-end timed channels. Proving a
given safety property “requires then (1) to prove a set of proof obligations ensuring
the correctness of the abstraction step (i.e. the end-to-end channels correctly abstract
the network), and (2) to prove ” at the abstract level. The expected advantage of such
a method lies on the ability to overcome the combinatorial explosion frequently met
when verifying complex systems. This method is illustrated by an avionic case study.
As a comparison point, in [3] Schneider & Treharne illustrate their use of CSP‖B
with a multi-lift system that can be seen as a distributed system using several instances
of a lift, minus the fact that the interactions of the lifts are actually centralised in a
dedicated dispatcher. Our goal is very similar, but in contrast to [3], we want to avoid
relying on a centralised, or orchestrating, controller.
Similar works exist on structured development with the B method using decompo-
sition, hence in a more “top-down” approach, and refinement. For instance, Bontron
& Potet [16] propose a methodology for extracting components out of the enrichments
brought by refinement. The extracted components can then be handled to reason about
them so as to validate new properties or to detail them more. The interesting point is
that their approach stays within the B method framework: this means that the mod-
elling of component communication and its properties has to be done by using the B
notation, which can quickly get more cumbersome than an ad-hoc formalism like CSP.
Abrial [17] introduces the notion of decomposition of an event system: components are
obtained by splitting the specification in the chain of refinements into several specifi-
cations expressing different views or concerns about the model. Attiogbé [18] presents
an approach dual to the one of Abrial: event systems can be composed with a new
asynchronous parallel composition operator, which corresponds to bringing “bottom-
up” construction to event systems. In [19], Bellegarde & al. [19] propose a “bottom-up”
approach based on synchronisation conditions expressed on the guards of the events.
The spirit of the resulting formalism is close to that of CSP‖B. Unfortunately, it does
not seem to support message passing for communication modelling.
As stated in the introduction, this paper is an evolution of [7]. More precisely, in ad-
dition to a more detailed explanation of the specification process we followed with our
model, we exploited the renamings of channels so as to give a fitter way for instanciating
and assembling several Cristals. We also illustrated a novel use of CSP‖B theoretical
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results: Indeed, theorems about refinement or equivalences of CSP‖B components are
usually used for easing verification by allowing one to re-express a CSP controller into
a simpler one. We used these results to show how to insert new behaviours by splitting
up a controller/machine compound without breaking previously verified properties.
7 Conclusion
With the development of a real case study, a platoon of a new type of urban vehicles
in the context of the industrial CRISTAL project, we address the importance of for-
mal methods and their utility for highly practical applications. Our contribution mainly
concerns methodological aspects for applying known results and tool supports (FDR2
and B4Free). We show how to use the CSP‖B framework to compositionally validate
the specifications and prove properties of component-based systems, with a precise
verification process to ensure the consistency of a controlled machine (P‖M) and its
generalisation to a collection of controlled machines ‖iEi (Pi ‖Mi).
These formal specifications form another contribution of this work. Indeed, having
formal CSP‖B specifications help – by establishing refinement relations – to prevent in-
compatibility among various implementations. Moreover, writing formal specifications
help in designing a way to manage the multi-level assembly.
This work points out the main drawback of the CSP‖B approach: at the interface
between the both models, CLIs and augmented B machines corresponding to CSP con-
trollers are not automatically generated. However, this task requires a high expertise
level. In our opinion, the user should be able to conduct all the verification steps auto-
matically. Automation of these verification steps could be a direction for future work.
On the case-study side, to go further, we are currently studying new properties such
as the non-collision, the non-unhooking and the non-oscillation: which ones are ex-
pressible with CSP‖B, which ones are tractable and verifiable? This particular perspec-
tive is related to a similar work by the authors of CSP‖B dealing with another kind of
multi-agent system in [14]. So far our use of CSP‖B for the platooning model reaches
similar conclusions. This nonetheless raises the question of which impact the expression
of more complex emerging properties does have on the model.
Further model development requires checking other refinement relations. It also in-
cludes evolutions in order to study what happens when a Cristal joins or leaves the
platoon, and which communication protocols must be obeyed to do so in a safe man-
ner. We also plan to take into account the lateral control and/or perturbations such as
pedestrians or other vehicles.
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A Specifying a Single Cristal
B constants
MODEL
Constants
CONSTANTS
MAX_SPEED,
MIN_ACCEL,
MAX_ACCEL,
ALERT_DISTANCE,
IDEAL_DISTANCE
PROPERTIES
MAX_SPEED ∈ NAT1 ∧
MIN_ACCEL ∈ INT ∧
MIN_ACCEL < 0 ∧
MAX_ACCEL ∈ NAT1 ∧
ALERT_DISTANCE ∈ NAT ∧
IDEAL_DISTANCE ∈ NAT ∧
ALERT_DISTANCE < IDEAL_DISTANCE
ASSERTIONS
∀( i , j ).( ( i ∈ Z ∧ j ∈ Z ∧ i ≤ j) ⇒
(∀k.((k ∈ Z)⇒ ( min({ j ,max({i,k })}) ∈ i .. j )) ) )
END
CSP constants
datatype Modes = SOLO | LEADER | FOLLOWER | LAST
MAX_ID = 10
nametype Ids = {1..MAX_ID}
MAX_SPEED = 0
MIN_ACCEL = 1
MAX_ACCEL = 1
MAX_POS = 0
UNHOOKING_DIST = 1
nametype Speeds = {0..MAX_SPEED}
nametype Accels = {MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL}
nametype Positions = {0..MAX_POS}
please_compress(p) =
let
transparent normalise
within normalise(p)
CSP channels
−− B machine channels between Vehicle∧CtrlVehicle
channel getSpeed∈ Speeds
channel setAccel∈ Accels
channel getXpos∈ Positions
−− B machine channels between DrivingSystem∧CtrlDrivingSystem
channel setPerceptions ∈ Positions . Speeds . Positions . Speeds
channel getInfluences ∈ Accels
−− Common channels between CtrlVehicle∧CtrlDrivingSystem
channel vehicleInfo∈ Positions . Speeds
channel vehicleAccel∈ Accels
−− Channels between an HCI∧CtrlDrivingSystem
channel hciAccel ∈ Accels
channel hciSpeed ∈ Speeds
−− Channels between other cristals∧CtrlDrivingSystem
channel comIn ∈ Speeds . Positions
channel comOut ∈ Speeds . Positions
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A.1 Specifying (CtrlVehicle‖Vehicle)
Vehicle
MODEL Vehicle
SEES Constants
VARIABLES
speed, xpos
INVARIANT
speed ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED ∧ xpos ∈ N
INITIALISATION
speed := 0 ‖ xpos :∈ N
OPERATIONS
speed0← getSpeed = BEGIN speed0 := speed END ;
xpos0← getXpos = BEGIN xpos0 := xpos END ;
setAccel(accel) =
PRE accel ∈ MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL
THEN
ANY new_speed
WHERE new_speed = speed + accel
THEN
IF (new_speed > MAX_SPEED)
THEN
xpos := xpos + MAX_SPEED ‖ speed := MAX_SPEED
ELSE
IF (new_speed < 0)
THEN
xpos := xpos − (speed × speed) / (2 × accel)
‖ speed := 0
ELSE
xpos := xpos + speed + accel / 2 ‖ speed := new_speed
END
END
END
END
END
CtrlVehicle
CtrlVehicle =
( getXpos ? xpos→ getSpeed ? speed→ vehicleInfo ! xpos ! speed→
vehicleAccel ? accel → setAccel ! accel → CtrlVehicle )

( getSpeed ? speed→ getXpos ? xpos→ vehicleInfo ! xpos ! speed→
vehicleAccel ? accel → setAccel ! accel → CtrlVehicle )
Abstract B model for CtrlVehicle rewriting
MACHINE CtrlVehicle_abs
VARIABLES
cb
INVARIANT
cb = 0
INITIALISATION
cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlVehicle =
PRE cb = 0
THEN
cb := 0
END
END
B CtrlVehicle rewriting
REFINEMENT CtrlVehicle_ref
REFINES CtrlVehicle_abs
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INCLUDES Vehicle
SEES
Constants_csp, Constants
VARIABLES
xpos_csp, speed_csp, cb
INVARIANT
xpos_csp ∈ Positions_csp
∧ speed_csp ∈ Speeds_csp
∧ cb = 0
INITIALISATION
xpos_csp :∈ Positions_csp
‖ speed_csp :∈ Speeds_csp
‖ cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlVehicle =
BEGIN
CHOICE
BEGIN
xpos_csp← getXpos ;
speed_csp← getSpeed ;
ANY accel_csp WHERE
accel_csp ∈ Accels_csp
THEN
setAccel(accel_csp); cb := 0
END
END
OR
BEGIN
speed_csp← getSpeed ;
xpos_csp← getXpos;
ANY accel_csp WHERE
accel_csp ∈ Accels_csp
THEN
setAccel(accel_csp); cb := 0
END
END
END
END
END
A.2 Specifying (CtrlDrivingSystem(mode)‖DrivingSystem)
DrivingSystem
MODEL DrivingSystem
SEES Constants
VARIABLES
myXpos, mySpeed,
preXpos, preSpeed
INVARIANT
myXpos ∈ N
∧ mySpeed ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED
∧ preXpos ∈ N
∧ preSpeed ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED
INITIALISATION
myXpos :∈ N
‖ mySpeed := 0
‖ preXpos :∈ N
‖ preSpeed := 0
OPERATIONS
setPerceptions(myXpos0, mySpeed0, preXpos0, preSpeed0) =
PRE
myXpos0 ∈ N
∧ mySpeed0 ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED
∧ preXpos0 ∈ N
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∧ preSpeed0 ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED
THEN
myXpos := myXpos0
‖ mySpeed := mySpeed0
‖ preXpos := preXpos0
‖ preSpeed := preSpeed0
END ;
accel ← getInfluences =
IF (preXpos − myXpos < ALERT_DISTANCE)
THEN
accel := MIN_ACCEL
ELSE
ANY new_accel
WHERE
new_accel = 2 × (preXpos − myXpos) − IDEAL_DISTANCE + preSpeed − mySpeed
THEN
accel := min( {MAX_ACCEL, max( {MIN_ACCEL, new_accel} ) } )
END
END
END
CtrlDrivingSystem
DrivingSys_percept(mode) =
((mode == SOLO) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed → please_compress(DrivingSys_act(mode)) )

((mode == LEADER) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed→ comOut ! mySpeed ! myXpos→
please_compress(DrivingSys_act(mode)) )

((mode == FOLLOWER) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ comIn ? preSpeed ? preXpos→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed→ setPerceptions! myXpos
! mySpeed ! preXpos ! preSpeed→ comOut ! mySpeed ! myXpos→ please_compress(DrivingSys_act(mode)) )

((mode == LAST) &
vehicleInfo ? myXpos ? mySpeed→ comIn ? preSpeed ? preXpos→ hciSpeed ! mySpeed→ setPerceptions! myXpos
! mySpeed ! preXpos ! preSpeed→ please_compress(DrivingSys_act(mode)) )
DrivingSys_act(mode) =
((mode == SOLO) ∨ (mode == LEADER) &
hciAccel ? accel → vehicleAccel ! accel → please_compress(DrivingSys_percept(mode)) )

((mode == FOLLOWER) ∨ (mode == LAST) &
getInfluences ? accel → vehicleAccel ! accel → please_compress(DrivingSys_percept(mode)) )
CtrlDrivingSystem(mode) = DrivingSys_percept(mode)
Abstract B model for CtrlDrivingSystem rewriting
MACHINE CtrlDrivingSystem_abs(Mode)
CONSTRAINTS
Mode ∈ 1..4
VARIABLES
cb
INVARIANT
cb ∈ 0..2
INITIALISATION
cb := 0
OPERATIONS
DrivingSys_percept =
PRE cb = 1
THEN cb :∈ 0..2
END;
DrivingSys_act =
PRE cb = 2
THEN cb :∈ 0..2
END;
CtrlDrivingSystem =
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PRE cb = 0
THEN cb :∈ 0..2
END
END
B CtrlDrivingSystem rewriting
REFINEMENT CtrlDrivingSystem_ref(Mode)
REFINES CtrlDrivingSystem_abs
SEES Constants_csp, Constants
INCLUDES DrivingSystem
VARIABLES
accel, cb
INVARIANT
accel ∈ Accels_csp
∧ cb ∈ 0..2
INITIALISATION
accel := 0
‖ cb := 0
OPERATIONS
DrivingSys_percept =
BEGIN
CHOICE
IF Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = SOLO
THEN
ANY vehicleInfo_myXpos, vehicleInfo_mySpeed
WHERE vehicleInfo_myXpos ∈ Positions_csp
∧ vehicleInfo_mySpeed ∈ Speeds_csp
THEN cb := 1
END
ELSE SELECT TRUE = FALSE THEN skip END
END
OR
IF Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = LEADER
THEN
ANY vehicleInfo_myXpos, vehicleInfo_mySpeed
WHERE vehicleInfo_myXpos ∈ Positions_csp
∧ vehicleInfo_mySpeed ∈ Speeds_csp
THEN cb := 1
END
ELSE SELECT TRUE = FALSE THEN skip END
END
OR
IF Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = FOLLOWER
THEN
ANY vehicleInfo_myXpos, vehicleInfo_mySpeed
WHERE vehicleInfo_myXpos ∈ Positions_csp
∧ vehicleInfo_mySpeed ∈ Speeds_csp
THEN
ANY comIn_preSpeed, comIn_preXpos
WHERE comIn_preSpeed ∈ Speeds_csp
∧ comIn_preXpos ∈ Positions_csp
THEN
setPerceptions(vehicleInfo_myXpos, vehicleInfo_mySpeed,
comIn_preXpos, comIn_preSpeed);
cb := 1
END
END
ELSE SELECT TRUE = FALSE THEN skip END
END
OR
IF Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = LAST
THEN
ANY vehicleInfo_myXpos, vehicleInfo_mySpeed
WHERE vehicleInfo_myXpos ∈ Positions_csp
∧ vehicleInfo_mySpeed ∈ Speeds_csp
THEN
ANY comIn_preSpeed, comIn_preXpos
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WHERE comIn_preSpeed ∈ Speeds_csp
∧ comIn_preXpos ∈ Positions_csp
THEN
setPerceptions(vehicleInfo_myXpos, vehicleInfo_mySpeed,
comIn_preXpos, comIn_preSpeed);
cb := 1
END
END
ELSE SELECT TRUE = FALSE THEN skip END
END
END
END;
DrivingSys_act =
BEGIN
CHOICE
IF Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = SOLO ∨ Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = LEADER
THEN
ANY hciAccel_accel
WHERE hciAccel_accel ∈ Accels_csp
THEN cb := 0
END
ELSE SELECT TRUE = FALSE THEN skip END
END
OR
IF Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = FOLLOWER ∨ Modes_csp_of_nat(Mode) = LAST
THEN
accel ← getInfluences;
cb := 0
ELSE SELECT TRUE = FALSE THEN skip END
END
END
END;
CtrlDrivingSystem =
BEGIN
cb := 0
END
END
A.3 Specifying the assembly Cristal(mode)
CSP part of Cristal (mode)
Cristal (mode) =
( CtrlVehicle [| {| vehicleInfo , vehicleAccel |} |] CtrlDrivingSystem(mode) )
Safety property
Property = vehicleInfo ? xpos ? speed→ vehicleAccel ? accel→ Property
B Specifying a Platoon of Cristals
CSP part of Cristal_p(pos,max)
channel com ∈ Ids . Speeds . Positions
Cristal_x (mode) = Cristal (mode)
\ {| vehicleInfo , vehicleAccel, setPerceptions, getInfluences,
getSpeed, getXpos,setAccel, hciSpeed, hciAccel |}
Cristal_p(pos,max) =
if (pos == 1)
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then ( Cristal_x (LEADER) [[ comOut← com.1 ]] )
else if (pos == max)
then ( Cristal_x (LAST) [[comIn← com.(max−1) ]] )
else ( Cristal_x (FOLLOWER) [[comIn← com.(pos−1), comOut← com.pos ]] )
CSP part of Platoon(max)
Platoon(max) = ( ‖ pos∈{1..max} @ [ {|com.pos|} ] Cristal_p(pos,max) )
C Detailing (CtrlVehicle(mode)‖Vehicle)
CSP channels
−− channels between CtrlVehicle∧CtrlEngine/CtrlLocation
channel accelIn ∈ Accels
channel speedOut ∈ Speeds
channel xposOut ∈ Positions
−− B machine channels between Engine∧CtrlEngine
channel speedSensor ∈ Speeds . Speeds
channel accelActuator ∈ Accels . Accels
−− B machine channel between Location∧CtrlLocation
channel xposSensor ∈ Positions . Positions
−− channels between CtrlEngine∧CtrlPhysical
channel phyAccel ∈ Accels
channel phySpeed ∈ Speeds
−− channel between CtrlLocation∧CtrlPhysical
channel phyXpos ∈ Positions
−− channel between CtrlEngine∧CtrlLocation
channel phyAck
C.1 Specifying (CtrlPhysical‖Vehicle)
CtrlPhysical
CtrlPhysical =
( getSpeed ? speed→ phySpeed ! speed→ getXpos ? xpos→
phyXpos ! xpos → phyAccel ? accel→ setAccel ! accel→ CtrlPhysical )

( getXpos ? xpos→ phyXpos ! xpos→ getSpeed ? speed→
phySpeed ! speed → phyAccel ? accel→ setAccel ! accel→ CtrlPhysical )
Abstract B model for CtrlPhysical rewriting
MACHINE CtrlPhysical_abs
VARIABLES
cb
INVARIANT
cb ∈ 0..0
INITIALISATION
cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlPhysical =
PRE cb = 0
THEN cb :∈ 0..0
END
END
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B CtrlPhysical rewriting
REFINEMENT CtrlPhysical_ref
REFINES CtrlPhysical_abs
SEES Constants_csp, Constants
INCLUDES Vehicle
VARIABLES
p_xpos,p_speed, cb
INVARIANT
p_xpos ∈ Positions_csp
∧ p_speed ∈ Speeds_csp
∧ cb ∈ 0..0
INITIALISATION
p_xpos := 0
‖ p_speed := 0
‖ cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlPhysical =
BEGIN
CHOICE
BEGIN
p_speed← getSpeed;
p_xpos← getXpos;
ANY accel
WHERE accel ∈ Accels_csp
THEN
setAccel(accel);
cb:=0
END
END
OR
BEGIN
p_xpos← getXpos;
p_speed← getSpeed;
ANY accel
WHERE accel ∈ Accels_csp
THEN
setAccel(accel);
cb:=0
END
END
END
END
END
C.2 Specifying (CtrlEngine‖Engine)
Engine
MODEL Engine(ac_er,sp_er)
CONSTRAINTS ac_er ∈ 0..100 ∧ sp_er ∈ 0..100
SEES Constants
OPERATIONS
p_speed← speedSensor(speed) =
PRE speed ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED
THEN
ANY sp WHERE sp ∈ 0..MAX_SPEED
∧ speed − speed × sp_er / 100 ≤ sp
∧ sp ≤ speed + speed × sp_er / 100
THEN
p_speed := sp
END
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END;
accel ← accelActuator(d_accel) =
PRE d_accel ∈ MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL
THEN
ANY ac WHERE ac ∈ MIN_ACCEL..MAX_ACCEL
∧ d_accel − d_accel × ac_er / 100 ≤ ac
∧ ac ≤ d_accel + d_accel × ac_er / 100
THEN
accel := ac
END
END
END
CtrlEngine
CtrlEngine =
phySpeed ? speed→ speedSensor ! speed ? p_speed→ speedOut ! p_speed→ phyAck→
accelIn ? d_accel→ accelActuator ! d_accel ? accel → phyAccel ! accel→ phyAck→ CtrlEngine
Abstract B model for CtrlEngine rewriting
MACHINE CtrlEngine_abs
VARIABLES
cb
INVARIANT
cb ∈ 0..0
INITIALISATION
cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlEngine =
PRE cb = 0
THEN cb :∈ 0..0
END
END
B CtrlEngine rewriting
REFINEMENT CtrlEngine_ref
REFINES CtrlEngine_abs
SEES Constants_csp, Constants
INCLUDES Engine(1,2)
VARIABLES
speed0, accel0, cb
INVARIANT
speed0 ∈ Speeds_csp
∧ accel0 ∈ Accels_csp
∧ cb ∈ 0..0
INITIALISATION
speed0 := 0
‖ accel0 := 0
‖ cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlEngine =
BEGIN
ANY speed
WHERE speed ∈ Speeds_csp
THEN
speed0← speedSensor(speed);
ANY accel
WHERE accel ∈ Accels_csp
THEN
accel0← accelActuator(accel);
cb := 0
END
END
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END
END
C.3 Specifying (CtrlLocation‖Location)
Location
MODEL Location(er)
CONSTRAINTS er ∈ 0..100
SEES Constants
OPERATIONS
p_xpos← xposSensor(xpos) =
PRE xpos ∈ N
THEN
ANY xx WHERE xx ∈ N
∧ xpos − xpos × er / 100 ≤ xx
∧ xx ≤ xpos + xpos × er / 100
THEN
p_xpos := xx
END
END
END
CtrlLocation
CtrlLocation =
phyXpos ? xpos→ xposSensor ! xpos ? p_xpos→ xposOut ! p_xpos→ phyAck→ phyAck→ CtrlLocation
Abstract B model for CtrlLocation rewriting
MACHINE CtrlLocation_abs
VARIABLES
cb
INVARIANT
cb ∈ 0..0
INITIALISATION
cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlLocation =
PRE cb = 0
THEN cb :∈ 0..0
END
END
B CtrlLocation rewriting
REFINEMENT CtrlLocation_ref
REFINES CtrlLocation_abs
SEES Constants_csp, Constants
INCLUDES Location(3)
VARIABLES
xpos0, cb
INVARIANT
xpos0 ∈ Positions_csp
∧ cb ∈ 0..0
INITIALISATION
xpos0 := 0
‖ cb := 0
OPERATIONS
CtrlLocation =
BEGIN
ANY xpos
WHERE xpos ∈ Positions_csp
THEN
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xpos0← xposSensor(xpos);
cb := 0
END
END
END
C.4 Specifying the assembly Vehicle2
CSP part of Vehicle2
CtrlVehicle2 = ( ( CtrlEngine [| {| phyAck |} |] CtrlLocation )
[| {| phyAccel, phySpeed, phyXpos |} |] CtrlPhysical )
\ {| phySpeed, phyAccel, phyXpos, phyAck,
speedSensor, accelActuator, xposSensor,
getSpeed, getXpos, setAccel |}
CtrlVehicle2_x = please_compress(
CtrlVehicle2 [[ accelIn ← setAccel, speedOut← getSpeed, xposOut← getXpos ]]
)
Vehicle2 = CtrlVehicle [| {| setAccel, getSpeed, getXpos |} |] CtrlVehicle2_x
